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224 QABBJEIMN v. Om OF LoNG BlU.OB [56 C.2d 
[L. A. No. 25494. In Bank. July 20, 1961.] 
THEODORE R. GABRIELSON, Petitioner and Appellant, v. 
CITY OF LONG BEACH, Defendant and Respondent; 
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA, Inter-
vener and Respondent.· 
[1] Oosts-Attorneys' Fees-Fund Preserved for Benefit of Other 
Persons.-The bases of the equitable rule which permits sur-
charging a common fund with the expenses of its protection 
or recovery, including counsel fees, are fairness to the suc-
cessfullitigant, who might otherwise receive no benefit because 
his recovery might be consumed by the expenses; correlative 
prevention of unfair advantage to others who are entitled 
to share in the fund and who should bear their share of the 
burden of its recovery; and encouragement of the attorney 
for the successful litigant, who will be more willing to under-
take and diligently prosecute proper litigation for protection 
or recovery of the fund if he is assured that he will be 
promptly and directly compensated should his dorts be suc-
cessful. These considerations are not apposite, however, if 
the attorney's and his client's ultimate objective is not to se-
cure or preserve a common fund but to establish personal 
adverse interests therein; in such a case fees must not be 
awarded. 
[2] ld.-Attorneys' Fees-Fund Preserved for Benefit of Other 
Persons.-To allow attorney's fees in a case where the attor-
ney's ultimate objective is to establish personal interests in 
a common fund merely because the attorney's services have 
benefited the class to whom the fund belonged would place his 
interests in conflict with those of his client; an attorney re-
tained to recover or protect a common fund so that it would 
be available when and if his client could establish an adverse 
right thereto might be induced to forsake his client's interest 
in the hope of securing more substantial fees from the common 
fund. 
[8] ld.-Attorneys' Fees-Fund Preserved for Benefit of Other 
Persons.-In a proceeding by an attorney against a city for 
attorney's fees for establishing the state's right to tideland 
oil and gas revenues declared by statute to be free from 
[lJ Allowance of attorney's fees against property or fund in-
creased or protected by attorney's services, notes, 49 A.L.R. 1149; 
107 A.L.R. 749. See also Oal.Jur.2d, Costs, § 36 et seq.; Am.Jur., 
Costs, § 63 et seq. 
Mclt. Dig. Reference: [l-5J Costs, § 32. 
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public trust for navigation, commerce and fisheries (Stats. 
1951, ch. 915, pp. 2444, 2445), wherein the city claimed as 
trustee and the state intervened as beneficiary of the resulting 
trust, the trial court could reasonably infer that the ultimate 
objective of the attoruey and his client was to deprive the 
city and state of all title and interest in oil and gas contained 
in the city's submerged lands covered by federal leasing 
applications held by certain corporations and to establish the 
corporations' ownership of the oil and gas revenues therefrom 
where there was evidence that the client and the corporations 
had filed such applications, that the client had transferred 
her application to one of these corporations, that the attorney 
purchased shares of stock in one corporation and receive!l 
shares of another corporation, apparently for services rendered 
the client, and became an officer of both corporations, and 
that he was aware of the federal leasing applications and of 
litigation unsuccessfully brought in the federal courts to com-
pel the Secretary of Interior to grant such applications. 
Id.-Attomeys' Fees-Fund Preserved for Benefit of Other 
Persons.-In a proceeding by an attorney against a city for 
attorney's fees for establishing the state's right to tideland 
oil and gas revenues declared by statute to be free from public 
trust for navigation, commerce and fisheries (Stats. 1951, ch. 
915, pp. 2444, 2445), wherein the city claimed as . trustee and 
the state intervened as beneficiary of the resulting trust, 
though there was evidence other than evidence from which 
it could be inferred that the attorney and his client were 
seeking to establish personal interests in the oil and gas 
revenues and that this other evidence would support a finding 
that the attorney and his client had abandoned federal leasing 
claims to the submerged mineral resources and had entered a 
prior state case solely for the purpose of insuring that the 
oil and gas revenue should be lawfully expended, it was for 
the trial court to resolve conflicting inferences and determine 
the weight to be given the attorney's disclaimer of adverse 
interest. 
Id.-Attorneys' Fees-Fund Preserved for Benefit of Other 
Persons.-In a proceeding by an attorney against a city for 
attorney's fees for establishing the state's right to tideland 
oil and gas revenues declared by statute to be free from public 
trust for navigation, commerce and fisheries (Stats. 1951, ch. 
915, pp. 2444, 2445), wherein the city claimed as trustee and 
the state intervened as beneficiary of the resulting trust, it 
was not prejudicial error to exclude evidence of the attorney's 
services before a committee of the Legislature in working 
out legislation to settle the controversy that arose between 
the eity and the state after a decision of the state Supreme . 
Court holding that the statute was a valid partial revocation: 
j 
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of the trust that necessarily resulted in a reversion to the 
state of the released revenues which the city held on a re-
sulting trust for the state, where in excluding this evidence 
the trial court was primarily concerned with the extent of 
services for which fees could be awarded if the right to fees 
was established, the attorney did not point out the relevance 
of the evidence to the issue of his motive, and there was 
abundant evidence that the attorney continued to champion the 
state's interest in the prior Supreme Court case, and evidence 
of similar activity before the Legislature would have been 
largely cumulative. 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los 
Angeles County. A. Curtis Smith, Judge. Affirmed. 
Proceeding by an attorney against a city for attorney's 
fees for establishing the state's right to tideland oil and gas 
revenues declared by statute to be free from public trust for 
navigation, commerce and fisheries. Judgment denying peti-
tion, affirmed. 
John W. Preston, John W. Preston, Jr., S. V. O. Pritchard 
and Peter E. Giannini for Petitioner and Appellant. 
Gerald Desmond and Walhfred Jacobson, City Attorneys, 
O'Melveny & Myers and Pierce Works for Defendant and 
Respondent. 
Stanley Mosk, Attorney General, Howard S. Goldin, Assist-
ant Attorney General, and Jay L. Shavelson, Deputy Attorney 
General, for Intervener and Respondent. 
TRAYNOR, J.-In 1911 the State of California granted 
to the city of Long Beach the tidelands and submerged lands 
lying within the city's boundaries in trust for certain uses 
and purposes connected with the development of Long Beach 
Harbor. (Stats. 1911, ch. 676, p. 1304.) The terms of the 
original trust were amended by the Legislature in 1925 (Stats. 
1925, ch. 102, pp. 235-236) and 1935 (Stats. 1935, ch. 158, 
pp. 793-795). Following the discovery of oil under the tide-
lands in 1937, it was determined in Oity of Long Beach v. 
Marshall, 11 Ca1.2d 609 [82 P.2d 362], that the city had 
the right to produce oil and gas from these lands, and in 
Oity of Long Beach v. Morse, 31 Ca1.2d 254 [188 P.2d 17], 
and Trickey v. Oity of LO'llg Beach, 101 Cal.App.2d 871 [226 
P.2d 694], that the oil and gas revenue could be used only 
) 
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for trust purposes. In 1951 the Legislature found that 50 
percent of the revenue derived from the produdion of oil, 
gas, and other hydrocarbons other than dry gas and all of 
the revenue derived from the production of dry gas were no 
longer· needed for trust purposes and declared such revenues 
frec from the public trust for navigation, commerce, and 
fisheries. (Stats. 1951, ch. 915, pp. 2444-2445.) 
The city claimed the released revenues and undertook to 
expend them for general municipal purposes. Felix Mallon, 
a taxpayer of the city, then brought an action to enjoin the 
city from expending the released revenues other than dry-
gas revenues for other than trust purposes on the ground 
that the 1951 statute releasing the revenues from the trust 
was unconstitutional. Mrs. Alma Swart, another taxpayer 
of the city, intervened. Through her attorney, Theodore R. 
Gabrielson, she alleged that Mallon was prosecuting a friendly 
suit and that he had failed to raisc the question of the un-
lawful expenditure of dry-gas revenues and other important 
legal and constitutional issues. She sought to enjoin the 
expenditure of any of the released revenues for other than 
trust pUrPoses. Although she joined in Mallon's attack on the 
constitutionality of the 1951 statute, she also contended that if 
the statute were to be held constitutional, it would be neces-
sary to interpret it as releasing the oil and gas revenues to 
the state rather than to the city. 
The trial court held that the statute released the revenue 
to the city and entered judgment for it. Both Mallon and 
Mrs. Swart appealed. Although she agreed with Mallon's 
contention that the Legislature could not constitutionally re-
lease the revenues to the city, Mrs. Swart also presented the 
contention, accepted by the court, that the statute was a 
valid partial revocation of the trust that necessarily resulted 
in a reversion to the state of the released revenues, which 
the city held upon a resulting trust for the state. (Mallon 
v. Oity of LO'llg Beach, 44 Ca1.2d 199, 212 [282 P.2d 481].) 
Although the attorney general was aware of this litigation, 
he took no part in it until after the decision of this court, 
when he filed an amicus curiae brief urging that a rehearing 
be denied. Thereafter the state brought an action against 
the city to recover the funds to which it was entitled under 
the decision in the Mallon case. In 1956 the Legislature took 
note of this litigation and concluded that the public interest 
would best be served by its prompt settlement. Accordingly, 
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between the state and the city and provided that the latter's 
share should continue to be held in trust and expended for 
trust purposes. (Stats. 1st Ex. Sess. 1956, ch. 29.) Pursuant 
to this legislation a consent decree was entered settling the 
main points of dispute between the city and the state. 
On March 27, 1956, petitioner Gabrielson filed a petition 
in the Mallon case for attorney's fees for establishing the 
state's right to the released revenues. The city resisted his 
application as trustee and the state intervened as beneficiary 
of the resulting trust. Following an extended hearing, the 
trial court entered its judgment denying an award of at-
torney's fees. Petitioner appeals. 
Petitioner contends that his legal e1iorts as attorney for 
Mrs. Swart secured for the state oil and gas revenues stipu-
lated to be worth $200,000,000 and that therefore he is entitled 
to reasonable attorney's fees from this fund. He points out 
that the attorney general and other state officials shared the 
view that the Legislature intended to release the surplus 
oil and gas revenues to the city and took no action to protect 
the state's right thereto until after he had successfully repre-
sented the state's interest before this court. 
Although petitioner seeks fees from funds in the hands of 
the city as trustee, the city and state contend that his suit 
is nevertheless an action against the state to which it has 
not consented. They also contend that petitioner is not en-
titled to attorney's fees on the ground that he abandoned 
the interests of the city taxpayers he purported to represcnt 
when he advanced the state's interest against those taxpayers. 
Finally they assert that petitioner was properly denied fees 
on the ground that both his and Mrs. Swart's purpose in 
intervening was to defeat both the state's and city's interests 
by tying up the revenues in litigation until they could es-
tablish personal interests therein under federal mineral leas-
ing applications. 
Before this proceeding was tried, the city and state un-
successfully sought a writ of prohibition in the District Court 
of Appeal, and a hearing was denied in this court. Petitioner 
contends that the denial of the application for the writ, even 
though no opinion was filed, is res judicata with respect to 
the defense of sovereign immunity and that in any event 
that defense is not applicable in this case. He also asserts 
that he did not abandon the interests of the city taxpayers 
on whose behalf he intervened. He points out that it is always 
to the taxpayers' interest that money not be spent illegally, 
) 
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and that given the determination that the oil and gas reve-
nues could not constitutionally be released to the city, it was 
to the city taxpayers' interest as citizens of the state that 
the money be released to the state instead of being accumu-
lated for trust purposes for which it could not economically 
be expended. Finally he contends that there is no evidence 
to support the trial court's findings that he and Mrs. Swart 
were endeavoring to secure the revenues for themselves. 
[1] In Estate of Stauffer, 53 Cal2d 124, 132 [346 P.2d 
748], we stated: "The bases of the equitable rule which 
permits surcharging a common fund with the expenses of 
its protection or recovery, including counsel fees, appear to 
be these: fairness to the successful litigant, who might other-
wise receive no benefit because his recovery might be COll-
sumed by the expenses; correlative prevention of an unfair 
advantage to the others who are entitled to share in the fund 
and who should bear their share of the burden of its recovery; 
encouragement of the attorney for the successful litigant, 
,vho will be more willing to undertake and diligently prose-
cute proper litigation for the protection or recovery of the 
fund if he is assured that he will be promptly and directly 
compensated should his efforts be successful" (See also 
Sprague v. Ticonic Bank, 307 U.S. 161, 164-167 [59 S.Ct. 777, 
83 L.Ed. 1184] ; Hornstein, Cmtrlsel Fce Awards, 69 Harv. 
L. Rev. 658, 662-663.) These considerations are not apposite, 
however, if the attorney's and his client's ultimate objective 
is not to secure or preserve a common fund but to establish 
personal adverse interests therein. In such a case fees may not 
be awarded. (Scott v. Supcrior Cotlrt, 208 Cal. 303, 307 [281 
P. 55] ; Stratton v. City of Long Beq.ch, 188 CalApp.2d 761, 
769, 771 [11 CalRptr. 8] ; Hobbs v. McLean,117 U.S. 567, 
581-582 [6 S.Ot. 870, 29 L.Ed. 940]; McCormick v. Elsca, 
107 Va. 472 [59 S.E. 411, 412-413] ; see also State ex rel 
Ebke v. Board of Eclttcation{1l Lands «f7 Funds, 159 Neb. 
79 [65 N.W.2d 392, 402]; M~'ller v. Kehoe, 107 Cal 340, 
343-344 [40 P. 485] ; Note, 49 A.L.R. 1149, 1159-1161.) Liti-
gation so motivated caUs for no added incentive in the form 
of fees from the common fund should the ultimate objective 
fail. [2] Moreover, to allow them in such a case merely 
because the attorney's services have benefited the class to 
whom the fund belonged would place his interests in conflict 
with those of his client. An attorney retained to recover or 
protect a common fund so that it would be available when 
) 
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and if his client could cstablish an adverse right thereto migllt 
be induced to forsake his client's interest in the hope of 
securing more substantial fees from the common fund. Thus, 
if the evidence supports the trial court's finding that peti-
. tioner's and Mrs. Swart's purpose in intervening was to defeat 
both the state's and the city's interests, the judgment must be 
affirmed even though their ultimate objectivc was not achieved 
and petitioner's services were therefore of benefit to the state. 
[3] In 1939 Mrs. Swart filed an application with the 
United States Land Office to secure an oil and gas lease of 
640 acres of submerged land pursuant to the federal Mineral 
Lands Leasing Act of February 25, 1920, as amended (30 
U.S.C.A. §§ 181 et seq.). At about the same time Earl G. 
Sinclair and Lauren D. Cherry filed a similar application for 
a lease of an adjacent 640-acre parcel. These parcels were 
part of the submerged lands granted to the city by the state 
in 1911 from which the city is and has been producing oil and 
gas. In 1947 the United States Supreme Court decided that the 
United States and not the State of California had paramount 
rights in the marginal seas bordering the state including full 
dominion over mineral resources. (United States v. California, 
332 U.S. 19 [67 8.Ct. 1658, 91 L.Ed. 1889].) In 1948 the 
Department of the Interior rejected the Swart and Sinclair-
Cherry applications, and the applicants brought actions in 
the District of Columbia against Secretary of the Interior 
Krug to compel him to grant their applications. 
In 1948 Mrs. Swart transferred her application to the Alma 
Petroleum Corporation, and Sinclair and Cherry transferred 
their application to the Cherry Petroleum Corporation. These 
applications were the only assets of the respective corporations. 
Petitioner purchased several shares of Cherry Petroleum stock 
and received about 25 shares of Alma Petroleum stock, appar-
ently for services rendered to Mrs. Swart, and he became an 
ofticer and director of both corporations. He was aware of 
the Washington litigation, which was being conducted by an 
attorney with whom he shared oftices and Washington counsel. 
The Washington actions were dismissed and refiled against 
Secretary of Interior Chapman, Secretary Krug's successor, 
in 1951. 
In 1952 the Washington actions were placed off calendar 
pending decision by the United States Supreme Court of the 
boundary between inland waters and the marginal seas along 
the California coast. The following year Congress enacted the 
Submerged Lands Act of 1953 (43 U.S.C.A. §§ 1301 et seq.) 
) 
July 1961] GABRIELSON V. CITY OF LONG BEACH 
(56 C.2d 224: 14 Cal.Rptr. 651, 363 P.2d 8831 
231 
quitclaiming the three-mile belt of submerged lands to the 
State of California and to those entitled thereto under Cali-
fornia law. Section 8 of the act provided, however, that it did 
not affect rights in submerged lands that had previously been 
. acquircd under any law of the United States. In 1954 in 
Justheim v. McKay, 123 F.Supp. 560, the United States Dis-
trict Court of the District of Columbia pointed out that this 
provision would protect any rights that applicants for federal 
leases might have in the submerged lands of the United States, 
but it held that the Mineral Lands Leasing Act of February 
25, 1920 did not apply to submerged lands. In January 1956 
this holding was affirmed by the United States Court of 
Appeals (Justhcim v. McKay, 229 F.2d 29) and in May the 
United States Supreme Court denied certiorari. (Jttsthcim v. 
McKay, 351 U.S. 933 [76 S.Ct. 789, 100 L.Ed. 1461].) In 
August the Swart and Cherry-Sinclair actions were dismissed 
pursuant to stipulation on the basis of the decision in the 
Justheim case. 
Petitioner filed Mrs. Swart's complaint in intervention in 
the Mallon ease in 1953 and argued the appeal before this 
court in 1954. After our decision in 1955, he resisted the 
petition for rehearing and continued to represent the state's 
interest in subsequent proceeding in the Mallon case until 
after the settlement of the controversy between the city and 
state pursuant to the 1956 legislation. 
From the foregoing evidence the trial court could reason-
ably infer, as it did, that "The ultimate objective of petitioner 
. . . [and Mrs. Swart] was to deprive the City of Long Beach 
and the State of California of all title to and interest in the 
oil and gas contained in the Long Beach submerged lands 
covered by the respective federal leasing applications held by 
Alma Petroleum Corporation and Cherry Petroleum Corpora-
tion and to establish said corporations' ownership of the oil 
and gas revenues therefrom. The intervention of . . . [Mrs. 
Swart and petitioner) was intended by [them] ... as a step 
to accomplish said objective, the real purpose thereof being 
to prevent expenditure of oil and dry gas revenues derived by 
the City of Long Beach from the submerged lands covered by 
said mineral leasing applications until such time as said appli-
cations were granted and leases issued thereon by the Secre-
tary of the Interior." 
[ 4] Petitioner contends, however, that in the light of 
other evidence in the record no inference can be drawn from 
the mere pendency of the Washington litigation that he and 
) 
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Mrs. Swart were still seeking to establish personal interests 
in the oil and gas revenues at the time she intervened in the 
Mallon case. Thus, petitioner testified that he concluded and 
so advised Mrs. Swart that any federal rights were gone 
following the Republican victory in the election of 1952, 
which paved the way for the return of the submerged lands to 
the states the following year. He then threw away his Alma 
Petroleum stock and wrote off his Cherry Petroleum stock 
as a total loss on his income tax return. Mrs. Swart took no 
action to prosecute her Wa,>hington action after it was put 
off calendar in 1952, and at no time did petitioner take part 
in the Washington litigation. Had he believed that there was 
any chance of establishing the federal rights after the sub-
merged lands were returned to the state, he contends that it 
would have been totally out of character for him, who showed 
such tenacity in prosecuting the Mallon case, to allow his 
interests in the federal applications to be handled by others 
and ultimately to be defeated in the Justheim case, with which 
he had no connection. Moreover, he asserts that had he 
wished to preserve the oil and gas revenues intact, he would 
not have advanced the contention that they had been released 
to the state. 
It is true that the evidence would support a finding that 
petitioner and Mrs. Swart had abandoned the federal claims 
before the intervention in the Mallon case and that they 
entered that case solely for the purpose of insuring that the 
oil and gas revenue should be lawfully expended. It was for 
the trial court, however, to resolve conflicting inferences and 
determine the weight that should be given to petitioner's 
disclaimer of any adverse interest. Unfortunately much evi-
dence of Mrs. Swart's and petitioner's objectives was unavail-
able. Mrs. Swart was too senile to appear as a witness, and 
ller husband could shed no light on the advice petitioner had 
given her. Petitioner's office associate who was cocounsel of 
record in the Mallon case and cocounsel with "\Vashington 
attorneys in the Swart and Cherry-Sinclair Washington liti-
gation died suddenly before being called to testify. 
There was testimony, however, that in 1955 petitioner had 
stated to the witness that in his opinion the United States 
was the owner of the lands from which the oil and gas rev-
enues were derived, and it is significant that from 1949 to 
1951 petitioner, together with the counsel who had filed the 
"\Vashingtoll actions, prosecuted the case of Trickey v. City of 
Long Beach, 101 Cal.App.2d 871 [226 P.2d 694], to enjoin the 
) 
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city from spending dry-gas revenues for nontrust purposes. 
At that time petitioner had not concluded that the federal 
claims were valueless, and in view of the saving clause for 
federal rights included in the Submerged Lands Act of 1953, 
the trial court could reasonably infer that petitioner did not 
consider that act conclusive. It may be that the chance of 
establishing the federal claims appeared remote, but the stakes 
were tremendous. Petitioner had made an intensive study of 
the law governing the tide and submerged lands, he was 
familiar with the pleadings in the Swart and Cherry-Sinclair 
Washington actions and he had studied the records of the 
United States Supreme Court in the proceedings between 
the United States and California. It was only after the deci-
sion in the Justheim case that the Swart and Cherry-Sinclair 
actions were dismissed, and there is no compelling evidence 
that they had theretofore been abandoned. The trial court 
was fully justified in concluding that they had not been aban-
doned when petitioner prosecuted Mrs. Swart's intervention 
in the Mallon case and that the purpose of intervention was 
to protect the value of the federal claims when and if they 
should be established. 
[6 ] P~titioner contends that the trial court. committed 
prejudicial error in excluding evidence of his services before 
a committee of the Legislature in working out legislation to 
settle the controversy that arose between the city and the 
state after the Mallon case was decided. He contends that 
this evidence was relevant to prove that his motive throughout 
was not to defeat but to protect the state's interest. It is clear 
from the record that in excluding this evidence the trial 
court was primarily concerned with the extent of services for 
which fees could be awarded if the right to fees was estab-
lished. It had ruled that only services rendered in the Mallon 
case itself could be considered in fixing the amount of com-
pensation, and it concluded that services volunteered to the 
Legislature to assist in securing the fruits of the Mallon deci-
sion for the state could not be compensated. It is true that 
petitioner stated that he was offering the evidence not only 
on the question of the amount of the fees that should be 
awarded but also to establish the equities of his case. He did 
not point out, however, the relevance of the evidence to the 
issue of his motive. Moreover, since he had attacked the effec-
tiveness of the attorney general's representation of the state's 
interest even after the Mallon case was decided and had 
contended that the attorney general failed properly to repre-
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sent the state before the committee of the Legislature, the 
equities he referred to could easily have been understood to 
relate to a right to compensation for all services rendered in 
the state's interest whether within or outside of the frame-
work of the Mallon ease. Even if the trial court erred in 
failing to see the relevance of the excluded evidence to the 
issue of petitioner's motive or that it was offered on tlIat issue, 
the error was not prejudicial. There was abundant evidence 
in the record that petitioner continued to champion the state '8 
interest in the Mallon case itself following this court's decision 
therein, and evidence of similar activity before the Legislature 
would have been largely cumulative. Under these circum-
stances it is not reasonably probable that had the trial court 
admitted the offered evidence, it would have resolved the 
question of petitioner's motive differently than it did . 
. The judgment is affirmed. 
Gibson, C. J., Schauer, J., McComb, J., Peters, J., White, 
J., and Dooling, J., concurred. 
Appellant's petition for a rehearing was denied August 
16,1961. 
